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donations are a unilateral commitment to transfer a portion of one’s utility to someone
else, and are used to distort the bargaining set and thereby influence the bargaining
solution. In equilibrium, these pre-donations are Pareto-improving over the undis-
torted solution; moreover, when the agents’ preferences are sufficiently distinct, the
equilibrium solution coincides with the concessionary division rule.
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1 Introduction
Consider a perfectly divisible good that needs to be allocated among several individ-
uals. Each agent receives a constant marginal utility αi per unit of the good, which
may differ across agents. As in Sertel (1991, 1992), this choice of allocation can be
analyzed as a bargaining problem, where the bargaining set indicates all of the possible
utility vectors from any particular division of the good and the threat point is the origin.
Suppose that the outcome is to be determined by a particular bargaining solution. A
bargaining solution takes the bargaining set as its domain and selects a particular utility
vector from the set as the outcome. Thus, could the individuals improve their outcomes
in the bargaining solution by somehow distorting the underlying bargaining set?
Here, we examine how the Kalai-Smorodinsky (KS) bargaining solution (Kalai
and Smorodinsky 1975; Kalai 1977, 1985) can be distorted using pre-donations. A
pre-donation is a binding, unilateral commitment by an agent to transfer a fraction of
his utility to another agent, via some numeraire good for which all agents have equal
marginal utility. These commitments are simultaneously chosen by the agents; the KS
solution is then applied to the distorted bargaining set.
We show that pre-donations will occur in equilibrium if the marginal utilities α
are sufficiently distinct. Moreover, when they occur, pre-donations are in fact Pareto
improving, helping the donor, the recipient, and all others. This somewhat surpris-
ing result arises because pre-donations transfer utility more effectively than changing
the allocation of the good. The original bargaining problem cannot impose transfers
among the agents, but only split the good in question. Pre-donations will distort the
bargaining solution so that a larger portion of the good is allocated to the agent with
the highest α, who then compensates the others via pre-donations.
In particular, if αi ≥ 2αi−1 for all i (where agents are labelled in order of increasing
marginal utility), then the good is fully allocated to agent n, who transfers αn−1 to
agent n − 1. He, in turn, donates αn−2 to agent n − 2, and so on. Thus each agent i
receives a payoff αi − αi−1, which is to say, the payoff as if he had been allocated
the full good, minus compensation given to the agent immediately below him. This
coincides with the Concessionary Division rule, discussed in Sect. 5.
Our paper is most closely related to Sertel (1992), which examines the two-person
Nash bargaining solution (Nash 1950) under pre-donations. He shows that only the
agent with a higher α makes a pre-donation, and that when the Nash solution is applied
to the distorted bargaining set, the outcome coincides with the Talmudic division rule.
Sertel and Orbay (1998) analyzed the same question allowing for an arbitrary threat
point rather than restricting it to the origin. Orbay (2003) also examines two-person
bargaining problems with pre-donations and arbitrary threat point. Under both the KS
solution as well as the Maschler-Perles solution (Maschler and Perles 1981), she finds
that there is almost always an incentive to the agent with a higher marginal utility to
make a pre-donation.1
1 When the threat point is set to 0 in Orbay, her results coincide with our two-person case, as does Sertel
(1991). When the threat point is strictly positive, the agent with higher marginal utility has greater incentive
to pre-donate, but this still only results in an efficient allocation if the marginal utilities are sufficiently
distinct, as in our work.
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This paper also relates to a larger class of mechanism design problems in which
agents can profitably manipulate a solution concept. The most well-known manipu-
lation mechanism is misrepresentation of utility functions by agents in an exchange
economy with a competitive allocation: in order to achieve a better outcome for him-
self, an agent can behave as if his utility function is different than the true one. Hurwicz
(1972) shows that any Pareto optimal and individually rational reallocation scheme
suffers from this problem. Another well-known mechanism is manipulation via hiding,
transfer, or destruction of endowments. Some examples of this are resource realloca-
tion mechanisms (Postlewaite 1974), Lindahl Equilibria (Sertel 1994), the men- or
women-optimal matching rule (Sertel and Sanver 2002), and exchange markets with
indivisible goods (Atlamaz and Klaus 2007).
Even so, the distortion of bargaining solutions does differ from manipulation in
classic mechanism design. There, agent types are unknown to the designer, who must
check whether agents would benefit by pretending to be a different type. Our environ-
ment takes place with perfect information: the marginal utilities of the individuals, the
bargaining set, and the bargaining solution are all common knowledge. Indeed, the
pre-donations2 have an obvious effect on the bargaining set, which the implementor of
the solution concept could readily invert. Moreover, while manipulations often hinder
the efficiency of a mechanism, distortions offer an improvement in our environment.
In addition to the problem of allocating a divisible good, this work can be read-
ily applied to other interesting economic problems. Orbay (2003) suggests a cartel’s
problem of dividing a market among its members, where one firm is more efficient
than the other and thus has strictly higher marginal profit. The undistorted KS solution
would equally divide the market in order to satisfy the less efficient firm, even though
it results in lower total profits for the cartel. Allowing pre-donations, however, would
result in the more efficient firm serving the entire market, while compensating the less
efficient firm as if he had been the only firm operating. Our work shows similar results
in an n firm cartel.
Our model also has applications in finance. For example, when a business venture
falls into default, a distribution problem occurs where the creditors have to be com-
pensated with the available assets. However, during market downturns, it is often the
case that there is no immediate buyer for the property, making the value of the assets
uncertain. One of the claimants might be willing to sell it at a very low price; but the
other may be more patient, preferring to let the asset recover its value before being
liquidated. The undistorted KS solution would result in equal division, but pre-
donations would enable the most patient creditors to retain the assets while com-
pensating those eager to liquidate.
We proceed as follows: Sect. 2 provides definitions and presents the model.
Section 3 examines the model in the three-person case, providing illustration and
intuition for the n-person case presented in Sect. 4. Section 5 discusses an alternative
interpretation of our bargaining problem as a division problem (as in Sertel 1992) and
proves that the pre-donation equilibrium coincides with the outcome of the Conces-
sionary Division rule under certain conditions. Section 6 concludes.
2 Sertel (1992) called pre-donations a manipulation of the bargaining set, but to avoid confusion with the
mechanism design literature, we have employed the term distortion instead.
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Fig. 1 Two- and three-person simple bargaining sets, and their KS solution
2 Model
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of agents. Given any integer n ≥ 2, an n-person
bargaining problem is an ordered pair (S, d), where S is a compact and convex subset
of Rn, d ∈ S, and there exists u ∈ S such that ui > di for each i ∈ N . Here, S is
called the bargaining set (or feasible set) and consists of all the utility vectors that
can be attained if the bargainers mutually agree. d is called the disagreement or threat
point, which describes the utility vector if bargainers cannot reach an agreement.
Following Sertel (1992), we set d = 0, the origin of Rn ; thus, the bargaining prob-
lem is determined by its bargaining set only. We also restrict ourselves to the following
class of bargaining problems.
Definition 1 A bargaining problem is called simple if and only if it has a bargaining
set of the form:
Sα ≡
{








for all k ≤ n − 1
}
where α ∈ Rn+ and 1 = α1 < α2 < · · · < αn .
For example, in the two-person case, the feasible set is a triangular area in the
non-negative orthant of the two-dimensional plane with a unit base and a height of α2.
For three agents, this extends to a tetrahedron of height α3 along the U3 axis; both are
illustrated in Fig. 1.
If one interprets the bargaining problem as allocating a divisible good among the N
agents, a simple bargaining set means that agent k receives constant marginal utility
αk from a unit of the good. The frontier of the set is a hyperplane whose slope between
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If B denotes a class of bargaining problems, a bargaining solution is a function
f : B → Rn that assigns a unique outcome f (S, d) ∈ S for any bargaining set
(S, d) ∈ B. These are usually axiomatically derived, and are an attempt to identify
a reasonable outcome of the process of bargaining, without explicitly modeling that
process in a non-cooperative framework (See Thomson 1994).
In a bargaining problem, efficiency of a utility vector is defined by Pareto optimal-
ity. We use weak Pareto optimality, in which an allocation is only Pareto improving if
it increases the payoff of every agent.
Definition 2 For a bargaining problem (S, d), an allocation u ∈ S is Pareto optimal
if and only if there is no w ∈ S such that wi > ui for all i ∈ N . The Pareto frontier,
P(S), is the set of Pareto optimal allocations:
P(S) ≡ {u ∈ S | ∀w ∈ S, ∃i ∈ N s.t. wi ≤ ui }.
We use the KS solution concept as our bargaining solution in this model. This solu-
tion proceeds by identifying each agent’s ideal (or maximal) payoff, ūi . The solution
is then the unique point where the ray between the threat point d and ideal point ū
intersects the Pareto frontier. Note that the vector ū often may not be feasible; if it is,
the bargaining solution trivially selects it. Since we set d = 0, this is formally defined
as follows.
Definition 3 For a bargaining set S ∈ Rn+, let ūi = maxu∈S ui denote the ideal payoff
of agent i . The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is the unique point u∗ ∈ S such that





for all i, j ∈ N .
Figure 1 also illustrates the KS solution for simple bargaining sets in both the
two-person and three-person cases.
Our purpose in this paper is to evaluate how the KS solution is affected when
individuals commit to unilateral monetary transfers prior to applying the bargaining
solution. Indeed, we restrict those transfers to a particular form: agent i commits to
transfer fraction λi of his utility to agent i − 1.
Definition 4 A pre-donation is a vector λ ∈ [0, 1]n where λ1 = 0.
Definition 5 The distorted bargaining set for simple bargaining set Sα and pre-dona-




∣∣∣∣∣ ∃û ∈ Sα s.t.
un = (1 − λn)ûn and




, ∀i ≤ n − 1
}
.
One can interpret pre-donations as payments made via a numeriare good for which
everyone has a marginal utility of 1. Notice that the pre-donation is a commitment to
transfer a percentage of future utility, rather than a specific quantity of utils. Moreover,
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Fig. 2 The three-person bargaining set after pre-donations
percentage λi+1 applies to any pre-donation received by i + 1, not just his utility from
the allocation of the good.3
The pre-donation of agent i has two important effects on the bargaining set. First,
it reduces the maximal payoff of the donor, ūi . Second, the pre-donations extend the
Pareto frontier outward, since utility is transferred more efficiently between agents.4
These effects are illustrated in Fig. 2 for the three-agent game. Point x in the graph
lies strictly above the original set Sα because of the more efficient transfer of utility.
Our particular formulation restricts pre-donations in two ways. First, agents cannot
pre-donate to those with a higher marginal utility, but it is never in agent i’s interest
to do so. An “upward” pre-donation is less efficient at transferring utility than simply
3 For this reason, there is no hat on ui+1 in the definition. A transfer of λi+1ûi+1 would only pass on a
fraction of agent i + 1’s initial allocation of the good. If agent i + 1 receives final utility ui+1, he must
have received
ui+1
1−λi+1 ≥ ûi+1 before executing his pre-donation but after receiving any pre-donation from
agent i + 2. Agent i is transferred fraction λi+1 of that utility.
4 For example, to transfer one util from agent i to agent i − 1 by re-allocating the good, one would have
to take 1αi−1 units of the good from i and thus reduce his payoff by
αi
αi−1 utils. To transfer one util by
pre-donation would only reduce agent i’s payoff by one util.
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allocating more of the good to the higher agent. Such a pre-donation would result in a
utility vector that lies in the interior of the bargaining set. Moreover, it would reduce
agent i’s maximal payoff. Thus, he would always be awarded a smaller utility in the
KS solution after such a pre-donation.
The more consequential restriction is that agents can only pre-donate to the agent
whose marginal utility is immediately below his own (i.e. agent 3 cannot pre-donate
directly to agent 1, even if he desired to do so). However, he may indirectly donate to
others, as agent 2 will pass along fraction λ2 of whatever utility he receives, including
agent 3’s pre-donation. The trouble that arises with allowing a larger class of pre-
donations is that donations to agent 1 become a public good. As agent 3 makes direct
donations to 1, agent 2 is able to profitably decrease his donations. We revisit this
issue in the Conclusion.
When pre-donations are particularly large, then some of the boundaries of the set
Sα(λ) will not even be weakly Pareto optimal. This occurs when the pre-donation is
so large that an agent gets more utility when the object is fully allocated to his donor,
rather than having any part of the object allocated directly to himself. This is illustrated
for the three person case in Cases 2 through 4 of Fig. 2; the dashed lines represent
the boundaries of the inefficient faces of Sα(λ). For this reason, we consider the com-
prehensive closure of the distorted bargaining set. This enlarges the bargaining set to
include any point that offers less than or equal utility than some point in the distorted
bargaining set.
Definition 6 The comprehensive closure of the distorted bargaining set is:
S
˜ α
(λ) ≡ {u ∈ Rn+ ∣∣ ∃û ∈ Sα(λ) s.t. ui ≤ ûi ∀i } .
The solid lines in Fig. 2 denote the boundaries of S
˜ α
(λ). One can interpret the
comprehensive closure as allowing the free disposal of utility. For instance, in Case 4,
the point (λ2λ3α3, (1 − λ2)λ3α3, 0) in the bottom-front-right corner is obtained by
allocating the good fully to agent 3, producing utility vector (λ2λ3α3, (1 − λ2)λ3α3,
(1−λ3)α3), but then disposing of all agent 3’s remaining utility. Note that the boundary
of S
˜ α
(λ) is always weakly Pareto optimal. We will use the comprehensive closure in
our analysis of the distorted game, but this is only a matter of analytical convenience;
in equilibrium, the KS solution is the same for set Sα(λ) or set S˜ α
(λ).
In our framework, agents simultaneously choose their pre-donations; then, without
any further choices from agents, the KS solution is applied to the distorted bargaining
set and actual transfers are realized according to the pre-donations. Consistent with
a Nash equilibrium, we require that each agent’s pre-donation λ∗i be a best response,
taking all others’ pre-donations λ∗−i as given.
Definition 7 A pre-donation equilibrium is a pre-donation λ∗ and allocation u∗ such
that u∗ = K S(S
˜ α
(λ∗)) and for all i and all λ̂i ∈ [0, 1], u∗i ≥ K Si (S˜ α(λ
∗−i , λ̂i )).
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3 A three-person bargaining problem
We begin by examining this environment when there are exactly three agents. This
offers a clear visualization of the pre-donations and the resulting KS solution, and
makes clear the mechanics by which pre-donations achieve Pareto improvements.
Also, we can fully characterize all the Nash equilibria in this environment; in the
following section, we will restrict our attention to a few of these.















where 1 ≤ α2 ≤ α3. This set is a tetrahedron with the disagreement point fixed at
the origin, as shown in Fig. 1. The Pareto frontier of Sα , P(Sα), is described as the
plane u1 + u2α2 + u3α3 = 1. The undistorted KS solution selects the point on the frontier








. In other words, the good
is equally divided among the three (even though their final utilities differ).
While pre-donations always distort the bargaining set, the exact effect depends on
the size of the pre-donation relative to the original maximal payoffs and pre-dona-
tions of others. In particular, we need to check whether a pre-donation to an agent is
greater than that agent’s utility from an outright allocation of the entire good; i.e. is
λ2α2 > 1, λ3α3 > α2, and/or λ2λ3α3 > 1.
This creates 8 possible configurations of these three inequalities. Two of these are
self contradictory: if λ2α2 > 1 and λ3α3 > α2 then we cannot have λ2λ3α3 ≤ 1, and
similarly if all three inequalities are reversed. The remaining possibilities are exam-
ined below and illustrated in Fig. 2. Note that Cases 3 and 4 each include two of the
eight possible configurations.
3.1 Case 1: λ2α2 ≤ 1, λ3α3 ≤ α2, and λ2λ3α3 ≤ 1
When λ2α2 ≤ 1, and λ3α3 ≤ α2 (as is the case in Fig. 2), the Pareto frontier is the
convex hull of the points (1, 0, 0), (λ2α2, (1 − λ2)α2, 0) and (λ2λ3α3, (1 − λ2)λ3α3,
(1 − λ3)α3), each of which results from allocating the good entirely to agent 1, 2, or
3, respectively, and transferring utility as promised. Any convex combination of these
points represents a particular division of the good among the agents. This convex hull
is part of a plane, described by u1 + 1−λ2α2(1−λ2)α2 u2 + α2−λ3α3(1−λ3)α2α3 u3 = 1.
Notice that the maximal payoffs are now 1, (1 − λ2)α2 and (1 − λ3)α3, respec-
tively. Thus, the KS solution selects the point on the frontier such that u1 = u2(1−λ2)α2 =
u3
(1−λ3)α3 . This creates a system of equations that has the solution:
K S(Sα, λ) =
(
α2
3α2 − λ2α22 − λ3α3
,
(1 − λ2)α22
3α2 − λ2α22 − λ3α3
,
(1 − λ3)α2α3
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Note that K S2 is increasing λ2 iff α2(α2 − 3) + λ3α3 > 0, and K S3 is increasing λ3
iff α2(λ2α2 − 3) + α3 > 0.
One can readily show that when λ2 ≤ 1α2 and λ3 ≤ α2α3 , this solution lies in the
convex hull previously described, which is to say that the ray from the origin always
intersects the triangular face shown in Case 1 of Fig. 2, rather than one of the other
faces.
3.2 Case 2: λ2α2 ≤ 1, λ3α3 > α2, and λ2λ3α3 ≤ 1
When λ3α3 > α2, agent 2 gains more when the good is allocated to agent 3 than when
it is allocated to himself. Thus, any point in Sα(λ) which partially allocates the good to
agent 2 (on the front-facing boundaries) is inefficient, and the comprehensive closure
will expand the bargaining set to S
˜ α
(λ) as shown in Fig. 2.
In particular, the triangular face described in Case 1 is now replaced by the convex
hull of (1, 0, 0), (λ2λ3α3, (1 − λ2)λ3α3, 0) and (λ2λ3α3, (1 − λ2)λ3α3, (1 − λ3)α3),
which is depicted by the plane u1 + 1−λ2λ3α3(1−λ2)λ3α3 u2 = 1.
The maximal payoff of 2 is now (1 − λ2)λ3α3, so the KS solution selects the point
on the frontier where u1 = u2(1−λ2)λ3α3 = u3(1−λ3)α3 . This system of equations has the
solution:
K S(Sα, λ) =
(
1
2 − λ2λ3α3 ,
(1 − λ2)λ3α3





It is noteworthy that this solution always lies on the line segment between (1, 0, 0)
and (λ2λ3α3, (1 − λ2)λ3α3, (1 − λ3)α3), which is feasible in both Sα(λ) and S˜ α(λ);
indeed, the KS solution would be the same under either.
Note that K S2 is increasing λ2 iff α3λ3 > 2, and K S3 is increasing λ3 iff α3λ2 > 2.
3.3 Case 3: λ2α2 > 1, λ3α3 ≤ α2, and λ2λ3α3 ≶ 1
When λ2α2 > 1, agent 1 benefits more when agent 2 is allocated the entire good than
when agent 1 is. However, since λ3α3 ≤ α2, agent 1 gets more in pre-donations when
agent 2 is allocated the good than when agent 3 is. Thus, any point in Sα(λ) which
partially allocates the good to agent 1 (on the right-facing boundaries) is inefficient,
and the comprehensive closure will expand the bargaining set to S
˜ α
(λ) as shown in
Fig. 2. The relevant face of S
˜ α
(λ) is described by u1 + λ2(α2−λ3α3)(1−λ3)α3 u3 = λ2α2.




(1−λ2)α2 = u3(1−λ3)α3 . This system of equations has the solution:
K S(Sα, λ) =
(
λ2α2
1 + λ2(α2 − λ3α3) ,
(1 − λ2)α2
1 + λ2(α2 − λ3α3) ,
(1 − λ3)λ2α2α3
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Table 1 Equilibrium pre-donations (λ∗2, λ∗3) in the three-person bargaining game
α3 ≤ 2α2 2α2 ≤ α3 ≤ 3α2 α3 ≥ 3α2
















































and λ∗3 = 2α3
Table 2 Equilibrium payoffs in the three-person bargaining game













































This solution always lies on the line segment between (λ2λ3α3, (1 − λ2)λ3α3,
(1 − λ3)α3) and (λ2α2, (1 − λ2)α2, 0), and is thus the KS solution under both Sα(λ)
and S
˜ α
(λ). Also, note that K S2 is increasing λ2 iff α3λ3 > 1 + α2 (which contradicts
λ3α3 ≤ α2), and K S3 is increasing λ3 iff α3λ2 > 1 + λ2α2.
3.4 Case 4: λ2α2 ≶ 1, λ3α3 > α2 and λ2λ3α3 > 1
If λ3α3 > α2 and λ2λ3α3 > 1, then donations from agent 3 are strictly better for
agent 2 and agent 1 than for either of them to be directly allocated a portion of the
good. Thus, S
˜ α
(λ) becomes a rectangle, and the KS solution will be its upper corner,
x = (λ2λ3α3, (1 − λ2)λ3α3, (1 − λ3)α3). Indeed, we would obtain the same result
applying the KS solution to Sα(λ). Note that K S2 and K S3 are strictly declining in λ2
and λ3, respectively.
3.5 Pre-donation equilibria
The equilibria of the pre-donation game depend on the original maximal payoffs, αi .
All of the Nash equilibria of the pre-donation game are reported in Table 1, and the
associated KS payoff is given in Table 2. These are found by checking the first order
conditions of the various cases; we now illustrate this for two of the most important
cases.
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First, suppose that α2 ≤ 3 and α3 ≤ 3α2. We can verify that λ∗2 = λ∗3 = 0 constitute
a pre-donation equilibrium. Note that Case 1 applies, and thus both agent 2 and agent
3 are harmed by any increase in pre-donations. This outcome is, of course, identical
to the non-distorted KS solution.
Next, suppose that α2 ≥ 2 and α3 ≥ 2α2, and consider λ∗2 = 1α2 and λ∗3 = α2α3 .
Again, Case 1 applies, and if α2 ≥ 2 and α3 ≥ 2α2, then both agent 2 and agent 3
would be harmed by any decrease in pre-donations. If Agent 2 increases his pre-dona-
tion further, Case 3 applies and his payoff strictly decreases. If Agent 3 increases λ3,
Case 4 applies and his payoff strictly decreases. This equilibrium results in payoffs
(1, α2 − 1, α3 − α2).
Note that whenever a pre-donation occurs in any equilibrium, it is Pareto-improving
over the KS solution without pre-donations. Also, notice that that for certain parameter
values (when 2 ≤ α2 ≤ 3 and 2α2 ≤ α3 ≤ 3α2, or when α2 ≤ 2 and α3 ≥ 4), multiple
equilibria exist. This should not be particularly surprising, since agent 2’s donations
are made more beneficial by agent 3’s donations, and vice versa. Thus, each could
abstain because the other is abstaining. The multiple equilibria indicate a potential
coordination problem among the donors.
4 The n-person bargaining problem
In this section we characterize two of the equilibria of the n-person simple bargaining
problem: one in which everyone makes pre-donations, and one in which no one does.
Of course, other equilibria can arise, as exemplified in the three-person game from
the preceding section; indeed, for some parameter values, neither of the two equilibria
described here exist. However, the process for finding other equilibria is well-exem-
plified by the three-person case; and deriving this in full generality would require an
analysis of 2n cases.
We first turn to the equilibrium in which all agents are willing to make pre-dona-
tions. Theorem 1 establishes that each bargainer has incentive to distort the bargaining
set when his marginal utility is sufficiently large, relative to the agent immediately
below him.
Theorem 1 Whenever αi ≥ 2αi−1 for all i ∈ N\{1}, then λ∗i = αi−1αi and u∗i =
αi − αi−1 for all i ∈ N\{1} and u∗1 = 1 constitutes a pre-donation equilibrium. Fur-
thermore, if the inequality is strict for all i , this outcome is strongly Pareto improving
over the undistorted KS solution.
Proof We begin by examining the analog to Case 1 in the previous section, where
λi ≤ αi−1αi for all i . To determine the relevant hyperplane, consider the outcome of
various feasible allocations. If the good were fully allocated to agent i , after pre-dona-
tions were executed agent i would receive ui = (1−λi )αi , while agents j > i receive
u j = 0 and agents j < i receive u j = (1 − λ j )αi ∏ik= j+1 λk .
If this calculation is repeated, once for each agent fully receiving the good, it pro-
duces n utility vectors; all other efficient allocations are merely a convex combination
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α j−1 − λ jα j
(1 − λ j )α j−1α j u j = 1
The assumption that λi ≤ αi−1αi ensures that the coefficient of ui is positive for all i .
The KS Solution also requires that ui
(1−λi )αi =
u j
(1−λ j )α j . Thus, we can substitute
for u j with
(1−λ j )α j
(1−λi )αi ui for all j 
= i and find the final utility awarded to i (after
pre-donations are executed) in the KS solution :
K Si (λ−i , λi ) = (1 − λi )αi
1 + ∑nj=2 α j−1−λ j α jα j−1 (4)
It is a small algebraic exercise to show that this solution is in fact a convex combination
of the n vectors (rather than lying on the hyperplane but outside the convex hull).
Now consider possible deviations of agent i , taking as given λ∗−i . If i plays λi <
αi−1
αi




and only if αi ≥ 2αi−1. Thus, agent i never has an incentive to reduce his pre-donation.
If i plays λi >
αi−1
αi
, we no longer are in the equivalent of Case 1. Instead, given
λ∗−i , it resembles Case 4. Specifically, agents 1 through i − 1 receive higher utility
if the good is allocated to any of agents i through n rather than to any combina-
tion of agents 1 through i − 1, and thus such allocations are inefficient. Formally,
(1−λ j )α j < (1−λ j )αi ∏ik= j+1 λk for all j < i . Moreover, fully allocating the good
to agent j ∈ {i, . . . n − 1} is weakly inefficient; if it were awarded instead to agent n,
any agents at or below j would receive the same utility, yet agents m > j would jump
from 0 to um = (1 − λm)αn ∏ik=m+1 λk .
Thus, when λi >
αi−1
αi
, the bargaining set is an n-dimensional box, and the KS solu-
tion will select its corner, where um = αm − αm−1 for all m ∈ {i + 1, . . . , n}, ui =
(1−λi )αi , u j = (α j −α j−1) αiαi−1 λi for all j ∈ {2, . . . , i −1}, and u1 =
αi
αi−1 λi . Hence
increasing λi strictly reduces the final utility awarded to agent i after the execution of
the KS solution and pre-donations.
Thus, λ∗i = αi−1αi is a best response to λ∗−i . This is a Pareto improvement over
the undistorted KS solution, where each agent i would have been awarded ui = αin .
If αi > 2αi−1, then αi + (n − 2)αi−1 > nαi−1, and (n − 1)αi > nαi−1. Thus
αi − αi−1 > αin . 
Of course, to reach this outcome, agents’ marginal utilities must vary significantly,
each being at least twice as great as the preceding one. While this is a strong con-
dition, it could nonetheless be plausible. For instance, a homogenous good is often
sold for a wide range of prices across various retailers. This price dispersion can be
supported in equilibrium due to underlying differences in consumers’ locations, pref-
erences, or search costs. Akin and Platt (2008) document remarkable price dispersion
in commonly-used prescription drugs, using US micro-data. For example, a 30-day
supply of 10 mg Lipitor pills (the most commonly prescribed medicine in the US) was
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purchased at prices ranging from $52.6 to $236.6. They explain this price dispersion
in a search model with insurance.
If αi ≥ 2αi−1 only holds for some of the agents, they may still engage in pre-
donations, despite the non participation of others. This would give rise to equilibria
similar to those in the previous section, where only agent 2 or only agent 3 made
pre-donations.
There are also equilibria in which no pre-donations occur. This equilibrium exists
when each agent has a marginal utility that is sufficiently small, relative to the agent
immediately below him. On the other hand, if marginal utilities are sufficiently distinct
for at least one pair of agents (αi > nαi−1 for some i), some pre-donations must occur
in equilibrium.
Theorem 2 λ∗i = 0 and u∗i = αin for all i ∈ N constitutes a pre-donation equilibrium
if and only if αi ≤ nαi−1 for all i ∈ N\{1}.
Proof Suppose all agents except i set λ∗−i = 0. This places us within the analog to
Case 1, and the KS solution in Eq. 4 applies. Thus, K Si (λ∗−i , λi ) = (1−λi )αi−1αinαi−1−λi αi .
The derivative ∂K Si
∂λi
is negative if and only if αi ≤ nαi−1. Thus λi = 0 is a best
response if this holds; but if αi > nαi−1, i will make a pre-donation even if all others
abstain. 
Note the overlap between the conditions of Theorems 1 and 2, indicating that in
intermediate ranges (2αi−1 ≤ αi ≤ nαi−1 for all i), both equilibria exist. In such cir-
cumstances, coordination would be necessary to reach the Pareto-superior equilibrium
that has positive pre-donations.
5 Relation to division problems
In our original simple bargaining problem, the question is how to allocate a divisi-
ble good among bargainers who have distinct but constant marginal utilities from the
good. By introducing pre-donations, we allow agents to directly transfer utility via
some numeraire good, although such transfers are voluntary and thus only occur if
they are individually rational.
An alternative but related approach is to frame this as a division problem, as was
done for the two-person case in Sertel (1991, 1992). Sometimes called a bankruptcy
problem, the division problem is a question of how to split E dollars among n agents
when the sum of their individual claims,
∑
i αi , is greater than E . Any prescribed
resolution to the problem is called a division rule, which Thomson (2003) defines5 as
a function D : Rn+1+ → Rn+ that splits the available amount such that no agent can
receive more than his claim, Di (E, α) ∈ [0, αi ], and the sum of the payoffs should be
equal to the available amount,
∑n
i=1 Di (E, α) = E .
In translating our environment to a division problem, we set E = αn and refer to
marginal utilities αi as claims. Thus, it is as if the object is allocated entirely to agent
n (who values it the most), after which the division rule dictates how large of transfers
5 See also Moulin (2002).
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Table 3 Applications of the
concessionary division rule in
the three-person case
α (1, 3, 6) (1, 3, 4) (1, 2, 4)
(
1, 32 , 4
) (
1, 32 , 2
)






















n must give to each of the other agents. Unlike a pre-donation, these transfers are
imposed, rather than chosen by the individual agent.
We now consider the relationship between our pre-donation equilibrium and divi-
sion rules. To some extent, these can never perfectly align. In an equilibrium where
some agent abstains from pre-donating, the resulting payoffs will sum to something
strictly less than αn—precisely because the KS solution still allocates a portion of the
good to someone who values it less than αn . This outcome, by definition, is never
contemplated in a division rule.
However, the equilibrium where λ∗i = αi−1αi for all i perfectly aligns with the con-
cessionary division rule. For the two-person division problem, this was coined by
Sertel (1991) as follows: Agent 2 concedes to agent 1 the highest payoff possible (up
to agent 1’s claim), subject to the condition that agent 2 gets no less than agent 1.
In practice, this rule would assign agent 1 a payoff of α22 , unless this exceeded his
claim, α1 = 1. Thus, the payoff to agent 1 is C D1 = min{1, α22 }, while agent 2 receives
C D2 = α2−C D1. For instance, claims of (1, 1.5) result in payoffs (0.75, 0.75), while
claims of (1, 3) generate payoffs (1, 2).
We generalize the concessionary division rule to the n-person case as follows:
Definition 8 For any vector of claims α ≡ (αi )i∈N , with value to be divided E = αn ,
let the concession of each agent i ∈ N be defined as:
Ci ≡ min
j∈{1,...,i}
( j − 1)Ci+1 + αi− j
j
,
with Cn+1 ≡ αn and α0 ≡ 0. The concessionary division rule assigns agent i a payoff
of C Di (αn, α) ≡ Ci+1 − Ci .
Under this rule, it is as if each agent i receives his full claim αi , but then concedes
the full claim αi−1 to the agent immediately below him, giving him a net payoff of
αi − αi−1. In the computation of concessions Ci , this occurs when j = 1 is the mini-
mizer for all i . This is subject to a caveat, however, that an agent with a higher claim
should never receive a smaller payoff than agents with lower claims. When j > 1
is the minimizer for some agent i , conceding the full amount αi−1 would leave i’s
payoff less than agent i − j − 1’s. Thus, his concession is reduced, resulting in an
equal payoff for him and the j −1 agents below him. Table 3 provides a few examples
in the three-person case.
Notice that if αi ≥ 2αi−1 for all i , then for any j ∈ {2, . . . , i}, ( j −1)αi ≥ jαi−1 >
jαi−1 − αi− j . Thus αi−1 < ( j−1)αi +αi− jj , and the concessionary division rule will
assign Ci = αi−1 and C Di = αi − αi−1. This leads immediately to the following
corollary.
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Corollary (to Theorem 1) When αi ≥ 2αi−1 for all i , the outcome of equilibrium
pre-donations λ∗i = αi−1αi coincides with the concessionary division rule.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we analyzed the distortion of the n-person KS bargaining solution via
pre-donations. When agents are allowed to simultaneously make pre-donations to the
agent whose marginal utility is immediately below their own, the equilibrium outcome
will often Pareto dominate the undistorted KS solution. In particular, if marginal utili-
ties are sufficiently distinct, the agent with the highest marginal utility is allocated the
entire good but provides compensation to the others via pre-donations. In this case,
the resulting payoffs coincide with the concessionary division rule.
Admittedly, our framework imposes an important restriction on pre-donations, in
that agent i can only pre-donate to agent i − 1. We could instead consider a game
where agents can directly pre-donate to anyone with a lower marginal utility; how-
ever, this model will not typically have an equilibrium in which all agents participate
in pre-donation. For instance, suppose agent n pre-donates to agent 1. This distortion
to the bargaining set also benefits agents 2 through n − 1, regardless of whether they
likewise pre-donate to agent 1. As a consequence, pre-donations to agent 1 are like a
public good, and these lower agents can free-ride on pre-donations from n.
Indeed, the best response of the lower agents will typically be to set their pre-
donation to 0 when agent n’s is positive. Moreover, this may not stop agent n from
pre-donating. A voluntary contribution model of public goods often results in a corner
solution in which many agents contribute nothing, while the agent with the highest
marginal value from the public good becomes its sole provider.
Another assumption we have maintained throughout is that marginal utilities strictly
differ. This makes it unambiguous as to where pre-donations are directed. One could
accommodate αi = α j where i > j for some agents by requiring that a pre-donation
from agent i +1 be split equally among all such agents, and that pre-donations to agent
j − 1 come equally from all such agents. If the latter is not imposed, the preceding
free rider problems would certainly arise. At the same time, one should note that even
when αi is close to αi−1, the equilibrium in Theorem 1 does not exist and agent i will
abstain from pre-donating.
Transfering of a share of future payoffs is a natural means by which bargainers can
alter the allocation of a good when the solution concept and the bargaining set are
public knowledge. As noted by Sertel (1992), no legal obstacle under commercial law
can stop agents from signing contracts under which everybody will be better-off. Thus,
individuals might generally manipulate many of the well-known axiomatic bargaining
solutions, such as the Nash, Maschler-Perles, Egalitarian, and Utilitarian solutions.
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